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1. Introduction 
This paper applies a parametric frontier model to the European banking industry. Over 
the last decade or so a vast literature has emerged, which uses a variety of approaches to 
analyse productivity in banking. Examples are the studies of Casu et al. (2004), 
Williams (2001), Kumbhakar et al. (2001), Bauer et al. (1993), Humphrey and Pulley 
(1997), Stiroh (2000), Alam (2001) and Berger and Mester (2003). Only a few papers, 
though, estimate a latent frontier model – one of the few exceptions is the study due to 
Orea and Kumbakhar (2005), who analyse the efficiency of Spanish banks. The key 
advantage of this approach is that it enables one to define endogenous bank segments in 
the sample under consideration.  
The present paper extends their research to several European countries. The 
motivation is the following. First, for most of their lifetime, European saving banks 
have operated within a well-defined market structure and in accordance with a clear 
regulatory policy. However, in recent years, at European level the market structure of 
the banking sector has evolved as a result of the European Union’s Single Market 
Programme (SMP), which was established in 1992 with the aim of facilitating the free 
movement of goods and services across member states in order to improve efficiency. 
The consolidation process that has taken place throughout Europe has also resulted in 
the number of banking firms falling from 9,100 in 1997 to 7,500 by 2003 [ECB 2004], 
and one would expect these structural changes also to have an impact on the behaviour 
and subsequent productivity performance of banks. The expected result of these changes 
is an increase in competition, and hence an improvement in efficiency. Second, a 
regulatory policy in each European state has been in existence in all national European 
markets since 1999. Competition and regulation are related to efficiency in the 
European banking industry – see Casu et al. (2004), Williams (2001), Kumbhakar et al.   3
(2001) and Orea and Kumbhakar (2005). Lastly, although European banks are clustered 
by countries, it is also possible for banks from different countries to be in the same 
cluster, which clearly has policy implications.  
Our principal aim is to endogenously identify clusters of banks in Europe. This 
is possible using our chosen framework, which differs from the traditional approaches 
assuming homogeneity of all banks. Moreover, this method is more effective than 
standard regression models in simultaneously segmenting and profiling banks in a 
sample. If the characteristics identifying banks are known, then cluster policy 
implications can be derived. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
existing literature on European banking efficiency and of the main features of the 
banking sector in Europe. Section 3 outlines the econometric model. The underlying 
theoretical model and the hypotheses to be tested are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 6. 
  
2.  The European Banking Sector 
Papers on banking using non-parametric models rely either on DEA (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) or stochastic frontier models. Two recent extensive surveys on frontier 
models applied to banking are Molyneux et al. (2001) and Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), who summarised all the research done in the area until 1997.  
Recent papers using DEA not cited in the above surveys include Dietsch and 
Weill (2000), who focused on 661 commercial, mutual and saving banks from 11 EU 
countries for the period 1992 to 1996. They estimated a DEA model, the Malmquist 
index, and a profit frontier model, and found an increase in both cost and profit 
efficiency, as well as in total productivity, mainly due to positive technical progress. 
Garden and Ralston (1999) estimated the technical and allocative efficiencies of   4
Australian credit unions. Worthington (1999) applied the DEA in a two-stage procedure 
to analyse Australian credit unions. Chen and Yeh (2000) assessed the technical 
efficiency of Taiwanese banks. Drake (2001) used the DEA to estimate the Malmquist 
index for UK banking. Casu et al. (2004), Williams (2001) and Molyneux and Williams 
(2005) studied various European countries. 
A recent paper using stochastic frontier models is Bos and Schmiedel (2007) 
who estimate cost and profit met-frontiers for the European banking sector. Valverde, 
Humphrey and Paso (2007) analyse the efficiency of Spanish banks with parametric and 
stochastic frontier models, and Dietsch and Weill (2000) compare the efficiency of 
French and Spanish banking with a parametric-free distribution approach. Latent 
frontier models have been applied in banking so far only by Orea and Kumbhakar 
(2004). 
We use a dataset on European banks from 1996 to 2003. There are 5,721 saving 
banks, 6,180 commercial banks and 11,816 cooperative banks in the sample. Table 1 
shows the distribution of savings banks across countries over the period examined. 
 
Table 1: Number of Saving Banks & Observations: by Country, 1996-2003 
Country  1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 Total 
Austria 13  65  66  67  67  67  65  65  475 
Belgium 15  14  14  13  12  11  10  7 96 
Finland 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
France 22  22  22  29  30  30  30  28  213 
Germany 592  584  588  572  556  527  490  233  4.142 
Ireland 3  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  21 
Italy 58  58  58  57  54  56  53  13  407 
Luxembourg 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  8 
Portugal 3  3  3  3  3  3  3  2  23 
Spain 30  38  39  39  39  41  42  46  314 
All banks  741  792  798  787  767  740  698  398  5.721 
 
Savings banks are found to be most common in Germany, Austria and Italy.   5
Table 2 reports the number of the commercial banks in Europe by country in the period 
analysed. 
 
Table 2: Number of Commercial banks: by Country, 1996-2003 
Countries  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 Total 
Austria  34  35  40  41  46  48 48 36  328 
Belgium  40  42  35  33  32  32 28 17  259 
Finland  5  7  7  7  7  6 5 5  49 
France  186  188  181  172  165  166 140 107  1.305 
Germany  182  192  187  177  180  180 168 130  1.396 
Greece  10  16  14  14  14  14 16 13  111 
Ireland  16  19  22  24  25  28 30 25  189 
Italy 95  110  108  117  110  118  112  46  816 
Luxembourg 114 115 108  114 106  93  88  63  801 
Netherlands  36  34  31  31  29  32 34 24  251 
Portugal  21  22  22  22  18  15 15  8 143 
Spain  72  75  72  65  63  66 63 56  532 
All  banks  811  855  827  817  795  798 747 530  6.180 
 
It can be seen that Germany and France have the highest number of commercial 
banks, whilst the lowest is found in Finland.  
Table 3 presents the corresponding figures for cooperative banks. 
Table 3: Number of Cooperative Banks & Observations: by Country, 1996-2003 
Countries  1996  1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Austria  19  18  26  31 45 50 40 20  249 
Belgium  10  9  8  7 7 7 7 6  61 
Finland  1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 8 
France 64 67 70 101 106 104  91  83  686 
Germany  1.012  993  1.184  1.171  1.069  974 816 370  7.589 
Italy  181  428  417  475 482 500 477 132  3.092 
Luxembourg  2  2  2  2 2 2 2 2  16 
Netherlands  2  2  1  1 1 1 1 1  10 
Portugal  1  1  1  1 2 2 2 1  11 
Spain  10  15  13  8 11  15  13 7 92 
All  banks  1.303  1.537  1.723  1.798 1.726 1.656 1.450  623 11.816 
 
Clearly, Germany and Italy dominate, with Finland and Portugal displaying the 
smallest number. 
 
   6
3.  Latent Class Frontier Models 
The theory underlying the model of bank clusters adopted in this paper was developed 
by Porter (2000). His model explains the persistence of geographical agglomeration in 
terms of population agglomeration and knowledge embodied in human capital and 
acquired through experience. A bank cluster is a geographic concentration of 
interconnected banks in a market. Agglomeration reflects population density and 
knowledge increasing growth. The clustering indicates that banks are organizations 
attempting to maximize profits, subject to resource constraints (Varian,1987). 
In our empirical analysis, we follow a stochastic frontier approach. This came 
into prominence in the late 1970s as a result of the work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). In this 
framework it is assumed that the residuals have two components (noise and 
inefficiency). The frontier is estimated using maximum likelihood techniques, and the 
residuals represent the difference between the observations and the frontier. A stochastic 
cost function can be written as:    
 
             1,2,    t    N, 1,2,     i      ;       ; ) ( ln it T u v it it X C it C it it … = … = + = + = ε ε                 (1) 
 
where Cit represents a scalar cost of the decision-unit i under analysis in the t-th period; 
Xit is a vector of variables including input prices and output; and ε is the error term. The 
symmetric component, v, captures statistical noise and it is assumed to follow a 
distribution centered at zero, while u is a non-negative term that reflects technical 
inefficiency and it is usually assumed to follow a one-sided distribution. The two 
components v and u are assumed to be independent of each other.    7
Given that estimation of equation (1) yields merely the residual ε, rather than the 
inefficiency term u, this term in the model must be calculated indirectly. In the case of 
panel data, such as those used in this paper, Battese and Coelli (1988) use the 
conditional expectation of uit, conditioned on the realized value of ε, as an estimator of 
uit. In other words,  [ ] it it u E ε /  is the inefficiency for the i-th bank at time t. Following 
Greene (2001), we can write equation (1) as a latent class model: 
j it j it j it j it u v x f C + + = ) ( ln ,                                               (2) 
where subscript i denotes the firm, t indicates time and j represents the different classes. 
It is assumed that each club belongs to the same group in all periods.  
Assuming that v is normally distributed and u follows a half-normal distribution, 
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where it j j it j it x C ln β′ − = ε ,  [ ] 2
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vj uj j σ σ σ + = ,  vj uj j σ σ λ = , and φ and Φ denote the 
standard normal density and cumulative distribution function respectively. The 
likelihood function for club i in group j is obtained as the product of the likelihood 
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The likelihood function for each bank is obtained as a weighted average of its 
likelihood function for each group j, using as weights the prior probabilities of class j 
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The prior probabilities must be in the unit interval:  1 0 ≤ ≤ ij P . Furthermore, the sum of 
these probabilities for each group must be one: ∑ =
j
ij P 1. In order to satisfy these two 
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where qi is a vector of variables which are used to split the sample, and δj is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated. One group is chosen as the reference in the multinational 
logit. The overall log-likelihood function is obtained as the sum of the individual log-
likelihood functions: 
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The log-likelihood function can be maximised with respect to the parameter set 
T
j j j j j ) , , , ( δ λ σ β θ =  using conventional methods (Greene, 2005). Furthermore, the 
estimated parameters can be used to estimate the posterior probabilities of class 
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4.  Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses of Interest 
We estimate a latent frontier model to analyze the efficiency of banks in several 
European countries. The underlying economic theory is given by Porter’s (2000) cluster   9
model. This model was proposed for industrial economics, but can be adapted to explain 
banking clustering in a geographical area. According to this theory the persistence of 
geographical agglomeration is explained by population agglomeration and knowledge 
embodied in human capital and acquired through experience. A bank cluster is a 
geographic concentration of interconnected banks in a region. This agglomeration 
derives from population density and knowledge. The clustering of banks in a global 
economy lies increasingly in local characteristics.  
Consider the banks operating in the European market. The frontier model allows 
us to test the following null hypotheses (see Barros, Ferreira and Williams, 2007): 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Savings banks): Savings banks perform efficiently searching for profits. 
This hypothesis is based on previous research on banking (Williams, Peypoch and 
Barros, 2007) and on strategic-group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977) which explains 
differences in efficiency scores in terms of differences in the structural characteristics of 
units within an industry. In the case of saving banks, units with similar asset 
configurations pursue similar strategies with similar performance results (Porter, 1979). 
Although there are different strategic options in the different sectors of an industry, 
because of mobility impediments, not all options are available to each bank, causing a 
spread in the efficiency scores of the industry. Therefore it is assumed that savings 
banks adopt cluster-specific efficient strategies. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Commercial banks): Commercial banks perform efficiently searching for 
profits (Peypoch, Barros and Williams, 2007). This hypothesis is based on the theory of 
transaction costs and property rights, as in Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), 
Williamson (1979, 1985) and Gross and Hart (1986). There are two critical   10
assumptions: First, the firms cannot write complete contracts concerning their funds 
allocation based on the interest rate. Second, investments are specific to banks' assets so 
that the same investment is less valuable with different assets. When both assumptions 
hold, the theory predicts that firms under-invest because they are afraid that their 
relationship with the other firms may end at same point. To minimise under-investment, 
firms allocate dedicated asset specificity (Williamson and Joskow 1985), which refers 
to investment which takes place with the prospect of selling a significant amount of 
product to a particular customer.  Given this asset-specific strategy, commercial banks 
are therefore assumed to be efficient.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (cooperative banks): Cooperative banks perform efficiently searching for 
profits (Barros, Peypoch and Williams, 2007). This hypothesis is based on previous 
research on cooperative banking at European level (Molyneux and Williams, 2005). 
 
Each of these hypotheses will be tested with the latent frontier model. 
 
5. Empirical  Analysis 
Financial statement data for commercial banks operating in fifteen EU countries 
between 1996 to 2003 have been obtained from the BankScope database. Table 4 
reports some descriptive statistics.   11
Table 4: Variable definitions 
Variable Description  Minimum Maximum  Mean  Std.  Dev 
Log Cost  Logarithm of total operational cost  11.395  7.638  15.888  1.493 
Log PL  Logarithm of the price of labour 
measured dividing the total wages by 
the number of equivalent workers  
2.817 0.782  6.409 0.396 
Log PK1  Logarithm of the price of capital-Stock, 
measured dividing the stock by the assets 
2.342 4.240  3.317 2.715 
LogPK2  Logarithm of the price of capital-
premises, measured dividing the 
premises by the total assets 
1.053 5.993  3.915 1.057 
Deposits  Log of customer deposits  0.000  12.832  4.279  2.547 
Loans   Logarithm of loans  1.281  12.975  5.766  2.431 
Assets  Logarithm of assets  0.000  13.730  6.965  1.996 
Dummy variables equalling 1 and zero otherwise 
Sav Savings  banks  0  1  0.256  0.436 
Com Commercial  banks 0  1  0.341  0.474 
Coop Cooperative  banks 0  1  0.401  0.490 
BE  Banks operating in Belgium  0.000  1.000  0.0253  0.1572 
DK  Banks operating in Denmark  0.000  1.000  0.6163  0.2405 
FN  Banks operating in Finland   0.000  1.000  0.00633  0.7937 
FR  Banks operating in France   0.000  1.000  0.19182  0.3938 
GE  Banks operating in Germany  0.000  1.000  0.1791  0.3835 
GR  Banks operating in Greece  0.000 1.000  0.0126 0.1118 
IR  Banks operating in Ireland  0.000  1.000  0.02822  0.1656 
LU  Banks operating in Luxembourg   0.000  1.000  0.10483  0.3064 
NL  Banks operating in the Netherlands   0.000  1.000  0.3398  0.1812 
PT  Banks operating in Portugal  0.000  1.000  0.2016  0.1405 
SP  Banks operating in Spain   0.000  1.000  0.8467  0.2784 
SW  Banks operating in Sweden  0.000  1.000  0.0092  0.0955 




We estimate a stochastic translog cost function with input prices (P), output descriptors 
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where Cnt is the natural logarithm of variable costs; t is a trend; logYint is the natural 
logarithm of the i-th outputs (deposits, loans, assets) from bank n in period t; log Pjnt is 
the natural logarithm of the j
th input price (wages, capital) from bank n-th in period t. A   12
“Type” dummy defining the type of bank (savings, commercial and cooperative) and a 
“Country” dummy are also included.  κ η θ δ π β α τ τ τ , , , , , , , , 2 , 1 , 0 kj js kr j k   are the 
coefficients to be estimated. The adopted specification is the cost frontier model, known 
as the error components model in Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998). Table 5 presents the 
results obtained for the stochastic production frontier, using a GAUSS routine.  
The Translog equation was estimated imposing symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices 
(Cornes, 1992). The latter requires dividing monetary values by the input price of capital-
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Young's theorem requires the following symmetry restrictions: 
rk kr π π = for all k and r,    and      sj js δ δ = for all j and s. 
These restrictions reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. Moreover, the cost 
function must be non-increasing and convex with respect to the level of fixed input, and 
non-decreasing and concave with respect to prices of the variable inputs. These conditions 
were not imposed, but they can be tested to determine whether the cost function is well-
behaved at each point within a given data set.  
To allow direct interpretation of the first order Translog parameters as elasticities 
evaluated at the sample mean, every series was divided by its average value (Coelli et al. 
1998, p. 33). On the basis of the number of observations and exogenous variables, we have 
chosen the Translog model with a half-normal distribution, which is statistically supported 
by the data. The error components model is then adopted as suggested by Coelli et al. 
(1998).    13
Table 5: Latent Translog panel cost frontier (dependent variable: log Cost) 
Variables  Latent class 1  Latent class 2  Latent class 2 
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⎯  ⎯ 
Nobs 1554  ⎯  ⎯ 
(t-statistics) in parentheses are below the parameters. Those followed by * are significant at 1% level.  Those followed by ** are 




The estimated parameters of the latent frontier model and their t-statistics are 
reported in Table 5. The log-likelihood value of the estimated latent mixed logit model 
is 1252.132. The overall fit of the model is reasonably good, the Chi-square statistic 
being equal to 205.123 with 10 degrees of freedom and a significance level of 0.00052. 
To summarise the results, it appears that there are three segments in the sample, 
which are statistically significant. The first one is the more representative, since the 
probability of a bank belonging to this segment is 0.527, whereas the probabilities for 
the second and third segment are 0.317 and 0.156 respectively. The segments are all   15
positively related to output and prices in the cost frontier (Varian, 1987). Moreover the 
trend is positive but grows at a decreasing rate in all cases. The first segment is 
characterised by a positive relationship with saving banks and a negative relationship 
with commercial and cooperative banks. The second segment exhibits a positive 
relationship with commercial banks and a negative one with the other two types of 
banks. The third cluster can  be identified as cooperative banks. As for the country 
factor, this is mostly positively related to the clusters, with few cases of a negative 
relationship.    
The above findings indicate that latent frontier models describe the European 
banking system fairly well, when allowing for heterogeneity and defining segments in 
the sample. This is an important result, since it implies that a common banking policy 
for all European banks is inappropriate, given the heterogeneity revealed by the three 
segments. Banking policies should instead be tailored by segments. Note that, given the 
number of available observations, the model cannot identify more than three segments, 
but more could in fact exist, with additional heterogeneity. Banks in the first segment 
can be identified as savings banks, consistently with traditional homogenous frontier 
models (Williams, Peypoch and Barros, 2007). The second segment corresponds to 
commercial banks, and all the statistically significant parameters have the same signs as 
in the first segment. At a European level, commercial banks face intense competition, 
and these results are consistent with previous research (Peypoch, Barros and Wiliams, 
2007). The third segment includes co-operative banks (Molyneux and Williams, 2005). 
Overall, our findings are quite intuitive, as European banks are clearly not 
homogenous. The most homogenous characteristic is the type of bank (commercial, 
savings and cooperative). This characteristic translates into clusters, and leads to 
different performance levels. As for the hypotheses of interest, we do not reject any of   16
them. In the case of the first one, this suggests that savings banks are efficient, as 
indicated by the negative sign (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991), and also found in other 
studies using other approaches (Williams, Barros and Peypoch, 2007). Similarly, both 
savings and cooperative banks are found to perform efficiently (see Williamson 1979, 
1985, and Caves and Porter, 1977, respectively). 
Therefore, banks appear to be efficient in using the unique assets they own and 
control (Teece et al., 1997). The main factor behind the segmentation is the specific 
property resource, that creates competition for banks in different segments. Strategic-
group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977), which accounts for different efficiency scores in 
terms of differences in the structural characteristics of units within an industry, could 
also partly explain the efficiency differences observed in the European banking sector.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has proposed an econometric framework for the comparative evaluation of 
European banks and their operational activities which allows for heterogeneity. The 
estimated latent frontier model appears to be able to capture the dynamics of the data 
better than standard methods.  Significant heterogeneity is confirmed to be present, 
implying that banking policies designed for specific clusters are more effective than 
common ones. It is also found that efficiency is a property of all the different types of 
commercial banks. 
The main limitation of our analysis is the fact that the data span is relatively 
short, restricting the estimation of latent classes to three only: a longer data span would 
allow the identification of more latent variables. This is left for future research. 
However, the present study already offers convincing evidence of the segmentation of 
the European banking sector, and of the resulting need to define business strategies and   17
policies specific to each segment.    18
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